Major Law Firms Oppose SEC Proposed
Shareholder Access Rule
A consortium of major law firms has asked the SEC not to
adopt proposed Rule 14a-11, the shareholder access rule, and instead to amend
the shareholder proposal rule to permit shareholders to use Rule 14a-8 for proxy
access proposals. Further, any prescriptive proxy access regime the SEC may
adopt should permit private ordering under state law to allow shareholders to
modify the SEC’s proxy access regime as they see fit, including by opting out
of the regime in its entirety. The law firms that signed the comment letter are
Skadden Arps, Wachtell Lipton, Cravath Swaine & Moore, Davis Polk &
Wardwell, Latham & Watkins, Sullivan & Cromwell, and Simpson, Thacher
& Bartlett.
In order to ensure workability and avoid the need for a special
meeting of shareholders, the firms said that boards should be explicitly
permitted to adopt or amend proxy access by-laws in the period between annual
meetings, subject to shareholder ratification at the next annual meeting. The
firms also urged the SEC to adjust upwards the ownership thresholds to determine
eligibility to use Rule 14a-11 to 5% for individual shareholders and higher
thresholds for groups of shareholders.
The law firms believe the SEC can achieve its goal of removing
impediments in the proxy rules to proxy access by amending Rule 14a-8 to permit
shareholder proposals relating to the election of directors with far less
complexity and disruption than a prescriptive one-size-fits-all rule. SEC
reliance on Rule 14a-8 would also show far greater deference to the value of
private ordering under state law which has been the hallmark of the federal
system of corporate regulation for decades.
Proposed Rule 14a-11 would have the practical effect of
foreclosing much of the potential scope and utility of private ordering in an
area of great complexity and factual variation. The proposal would preclude
companies and their shareholders from adopting any form of proxy access that is
more restrictive, thereby eliminating the flexibility and experimentation
necessary to deal with the complex issues that inevitably will arise.
The workability issues do not have one obvious solution, according
to the firms, but can rationally be resolved in a number of different ways,
illustrating that a one-size-fits-all approach is inherently flawed as a
regulatory model for proxy access. There are over 7,000 public companies that
would be subject to proposed Rule 14a-11, the firms noted, and the appropriate
form of proxy access will depend upon a number of factors, including a
company’s state of incorporation, capital structure, board composition,
shareholder base and governance practices.
The firms said a single, national prescriptive rule is neither
adequate to address all of the issues and ambiguities that will arise nor
readily adaptable to unique circumstances. Private ordering, on the other hand,
not only allows flexibility of design but also provides an inherent capability
of dealing with error, ambiguity and change of circumstance as companies and
their shareholders gain experience with proxy access, without requiring the SEC
to continually interpret and amend its access rules.
Private ordering under enabling state corporate statutes has
proven responsive to changing shareholder views concerning other governance
matters with meaningful changes such as the widespread adoption of majority
voting and the elimination of classified boards. Delaware amended its corporate
statute explicitly to enable the adoption of a by-law establishing a proxy
access regime by board or shareholder action.
The firms also recommended that the SEC exempt controlled
companies that are majority-owned by one or more shareholders from proposed Rule
14a-11. Since voting at these companies is predetermined through the sizeable
voting block held by the controlling shareholders, subjecting those companies
and their stockholders to the proxy access process would impose costs without
any possibility of the shareholder nominee’s election.